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Mr. Chairman, Representative Smith, Members of the Committee: I thank you for
the opportunity to express my views about presidential signing statements.
I will use my time in an attempt to separate out the various structural
constitutional issues raised by signing statements. As you know, there has been
significant confusion on this topic in the popular press; I hope that by disaggregating the
various issues and discussing them dispassionately, we may at a minimum dispel some of
the more hysterical assertions that have found their way into print. 1
1

For example, this topic has been plagued with false statistics, beginning with the Boston Globe’s repeated
claim that the President “has quietly claimed the authority to disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he
took office.” Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1
(emphasis added). The New York Times picked up this erroneous claim, but rendered it even more wrong,
citing the Boston Globe for the claim that “Mr. Bush had issued more than 750 ‘presidential signing
statements’ declaring he wouldn’t do what the laws required.” Editorial, Veto? Who Needs a Veto?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2006, at A22 (emphasis added). And from the Globe to the Times to the House of
Representatives, this factoid has now found its way into a bill pending before the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform. See H.R. 264, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (2007) (“According to a May 5,
2006, editorial in the New York Times, the . . . President . . . has issued more than 750 ‘presidential signing
statements’ declaring he would not do what the laws required.”). But this statistic is patently false.
President Bush has issued approximately 140 signing statements to date, less than one fifth of the number
claimed by The New York Times as quoted in H.R. 264. See THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
Presidential Signing Statements, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/signingstatements.php
?year=2006&Submit=DISPLAY; see also Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Michelle Boardman, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice) [hereinafter Boardman Senate Testimony],
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1969&wit_id=5479 (noting that President Bush
issued 73 signing statements between January 2003 and June 2006). The Globe issued a statement, which
was widely ignored, to correct the misunderstanding. See Correction, For the Record, BOSTON GLOBE, May
4, 2006, at A2 (clarifying that 125 signing statements had been issued by President Bush at the time of the
original article’s publication). The Boston Globe’s original error, which has so multiplied and
transmogrified, apparently began with confusion about the word “law,” which it seemingly meant to signify
something like “provision” or “section” or perhaps “subsection.” Needless to say, this is not what the U.S.
Constitution means by the word “law.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (setting forth the mechanism by which a
bill may become “a law”) (emphasis added). Even sources that understand the truth have chosen to trade
on the error. Compare American Bar Association, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the
Separation of Powers Doctrine, Report [hereinafter ABA Report], http://www.abanet.org/op/
signingstatements/aba_final_signing_statements_recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf, at 1 (quoting the
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In addition, the Committee may be interested in possible legislative responses to
the President’s use of signing statements. As you know, Representative Jackson Lee has
already introduced a bill to regulate the creation and use of signing statements. 2
Likewise, Senator Specter introduced a somewhat similar bill last summer, 3 which may
also be of interest to the Committee. Therefore, I will address the constitutionality and
the structural desirability of these and other possible legislative measures.
I should mention that I testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on this
same topic last summer, 4 and I will be drawing substantially from that prior testimony
today (in Parts I-III). I should also say that I largely agree with the position put forth by
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Michelle Boardman at that hearing, 5 and I commend
her testimony to this Committee.
As Ms. Boardman explained, this President’s signing statements have not differed
significantly from those of his recent predecessors. 6 And in any event, as I shall explain,
presidential signing statements are an entirely appropriate means by which the President
fulfills his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 7
I. Executive Interpretation
The most important and most common function of presidential signing statements
is to announce—to the Executive Branch and to the public—the President’s interpretation
of the law. 8 The propriety of such an announcement should be obvious. 9 There is an oftBoston Globe in the first sentence of its report and relying on its reporting for the entire first page), with id.
at 14 n.52 (noting, in a footnote on page 14, that “these numbers refer to the number of challenges to
provisions of laws rather than the number of signing statements”). Finally, quite apart from the erroneous
numbers, none, or almost none, of the President’s signing statements “claim the authority to disobey” any
laws, as I shall explain. See infra Part II.
2
H.R. 264, 110th Cong. (2007).
3
S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006).
4
See Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center) [hereinafter Rosenkranz Senate Testimony], available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=1969&wit_id=5483; see also Letter from Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Associate
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, to Senator Arlen Specter, Chairman, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary (Aug. 15, 2006) (on file with author).
5
See Boardman Senate Testimony, supra note 1.
6
See id.
7
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
8
Virtually every paragraph of every signing statement by this President uses the word “construe,”
emphasizing that the purpose of the statement is to interpret the statute. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 425
(March 9, 2006) (“The executive branch shall construe the provisions of H.R. 3199 that call for furnishing
information to entities outside the executive branch . . . in a manner consistent with the President’s
constitutional authority to . . . withhold information the disclosure of which would impair foreign relations,
national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s
constitutional duties. . . . The executive branch shall construe section 756(e)(2) of H.R. 3199 . . . in a
manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch
and to recommend for the consideration of the Congress such measures as he judges necessary and
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repeated canard that the President has no business interpreting federal statutes—his job is
to execute the laws, and interpretation should be left to the courts. 10 A moment’s
reflection reveals that this view is unsound. It is simply impossible, as a matter of logic,
to execute a law without determining what it means.
A. Informing the Executive Branch of the President’s Interpretation
Imagine, for example, a statute that imposes a tariff on the importation of
“vegetables.” Comes an eighteen-wheeler full of tomatoes. Is a tomato a vegetable? At
the end of the day, maybe the Supreme Court will decide,11 but long before then, the
executive branch is put to a choice: stop the truck at the border or let it through. There is
no ducking the question; either choice implies an interpretation of the statute, an
interpretation of the word “vegetable.” And the President cannot simply flip a coin. He
has a constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” 12 and this
faithfulness inherently and inevitably includes a good faith effort to determine what “the
Laws” mean. In short, as the Supreme Court has explained, “[i]nterpreting a law enacted
by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of
the law.” 13
Nor is the President obliged to leave the choice to individual Border Patrol agents.
The Supreme Court has rightly said that the President can and should “supervise and
guide [executive officers’] construction of the statutes under which they act in order to
secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the Constitution

expedient.”) (emphasis added); Remarks on Signing the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 42 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 215 (February 8, 2006) (“The executive branch shall construe section 1936(d)(2) of the Social
Security Act . . ., which purports to make consultation with a legislative agent a precondition to execution
of the law, to call for but not mandate such consultation, as is consistent with the Constitution’s provisions
concerning the separate powers of the Congress to legislate and the President to execute the laws.”)
(emphasis added); Statement on Signing the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005,
42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 39 (January 10, 2006) (“The executive branch shall construe this reporting
requirement in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief
and the President’s constitutional authority to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.”) (emphasis added).
9
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Eric Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power 24
(Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 133, 2006), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/133.pdf (noting that if the President misinterprets
statutes in signing statements, the problem is “the underlying views expressed in the statements, not the
statements themselves”); Posting of Marty Lederman et al. to the Georgetown Law Faculty Blog,
Untangling
the
Debate
on
Signing
Statements,
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/
georgetown_university_law/2006/07/thanks_to_the_p.html (July 31, 2006) (“There is nothing inherently
wrong with signing statements as such—including those that contain constitutional objections.”).
10
See, e.g., Editorial, Veto? Who Needs a Veto?, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2006, at A22 (“[No former
presidents] have used [signing statements] so clearly to make the president the interpreter of a law’s intent,
instead of Congress, and the arbiter of constitutionality, instead of the courts.”); Bob Egelko, How Bush
Sidesteps Intent of Congress, S.F. CHRON., May 7, 2006, at A1 (“The civics-book answer is clear: Congress
passes the laws, the president carries them out, and the courts decide whether they’re constitutional.”).
11
See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893) (holding that the tomato, though botanically a fruit, is
commonly used as a vegetable and therefore should be treated as such for tax purposes).
12
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
13
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
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evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.” 14 And
as Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel under
President Clinton, has explained, this is a “generally uncontroversial . . . function of
presidential signing statements”—“to guide and direct executive officials in interpreting
or administering a statute.” 15
B. Informing the Public of the President’s Interpretation
Of course, the President need not make his interpretations public; he could quietly
instruct the U.S. Border Patrol that a tomato is a vegetable and have done with it. But
there are many good reasons why, in most circumstances, a public statement of
interpretation is desirable. First, if the President’s interpretation is public, then those who
believe that his interpretation is erroneous can better and more quickly structure a
challenge in court. Second, a public statement of interpretation reduces legal uncertainty;
if people know the President’s interpretation, they are better able to organize their affairs
accordingly. 16 Third, and perhaps most important, a public statement informs Congress
of the President’s interpretation, and if Congress disagrees, it may pass a bill clarifying
the matter.
In short, in the United States, we have a strong preference for sunlight in
government. 17 Once it is clear that interpreting the law is essential to executing it, there
can be no independent objection to the President making his interpretations public. This
is the primary function of presidential signing statements, and President Clinton’s Office
of Legal Counsel was quite right to call this function “uncontroversial.” 18
II. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
The President interprets statutes in much the same way that courts do, with the
same panoply of tools and strategies. His lawyers carefully study the text and structure of
Acts of Congress, 19 aided perhaps by dictionaries, linguistic treatises, and other tools of
14

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 17 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131, 132
(1993) [hereinafter OLC Signing Statements Memorandum].
16
See Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of Presidential “Signing
Statements”, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209, 227-28 (1988) (arguing that the President’s decision to announce his
interpretation of a statute in a signing statement beneficially increases the transparency of executive branch
decision-making); Lederman et al., supra note 9 (“The signing statement is a good thing: a manifestation of
the Executive’s intentions that helps us to understand the heart of the problem. . . . [I]t is much better that
[the President] tell Congress and the public of his intentions, rather than keep it secret . . . .”); see also John
E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L.
REV. 965 (1984) (analyzing the types of costs arising from uncertainty about legal rules); Michael P. Van
Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 822-36 (2002) (analyzing the costs that arise
from uncertainty when new statutes are enacted and the importance of interpretive rules for reducing that
uncertainty).
17
Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam) (“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants
. . . .”) (quoting LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY (1933)).
18
OLC Signing Statements Memorandum, supra note 15, at 132.
19
See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Veterans Health Programs Improvement Act of 2004, 40 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 2886 (November 30, 2004) (“The executive branch shall construe the repeal, in section
15
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statutory interpretation. In addition, just like courts, they also apply well-established
maxims of statutory interpretation, called canons. 20
One canon in particular is of interest today. As Justice Holmes explained in 1927,
“[T]he rule is settled that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of
which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that
which will save the Act.” 21 This is known as the canon of constitutional avoidance, 22 and
it “is followed out of respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of
constitutional limitations.” 23
This is the canon that the President is applying when he says, in signing
statements, that he will construe a particular provision to be consistent with a particular
constitutional command. 24 Many of the presidential signing statements that have most
exercised the press have taken this form, 25 so it is crucial to understand what these
1561(c) of the Act, of section 127 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2003, as
contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 108-7) as repealing the amendments
that were made to title 19 of the United States Code by section 127. Such a construction of section 1561(c)
is consistent with the text and structure of amendments to title 19 made by section 1561.”) (emphasis
added); Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1918 (December 30, 2005) (“[N]oting that the text and structure of Title X do not create a private
right of action to enforce Title X, the executive branch shall construe Title X not to create a private right of
action.”) (emphasis added); Statement on Signing the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1273 (August 10, 2005) (“The executive
branch shall construe section 5305(g)(3) of the Act to be a statute to which section 552(b)(3)(A) of title 5,
United States Code, refers, as the text and structure of section 5305(g) indicate.”) (emphasis added). See
also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 n.7 (2001) (“[O]ur methodology is not novel, but well
established in earlier decisions . . ., which explain that the interpretive inquiry begins with the text and
structure of the statute . . . .”) (emphasis added).
20
For example, compare Statement on Signing Communications Legislation, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 3013 (December 23, 2004) (applying “the principle of statutory construction of giving effect to each
of two statutes addressing the same subject whenever they can co-exist”) with Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 551 (1974) (“[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a
clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”).
21
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
22
See, e.g., Artichoke Joe’s California Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 730 (9th Cir. 2003).
23
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-191 (1991). See also Ex parte Randolph, 20 F.Cas. 242, 254
(C.C.D.Va. 1833) (No. 11,558) (Marshall, C.J.).
24
See Bradley & Posner, supra note 9, at 27 (“When presidents have constitutional concerns, it is rare for
them to announce in a signing statement that they will decline to enforce a statutory provision. Instead, they
frequently state that they will interpret the provision in a way that will avoid the purported constitutional
problem.”). Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1189, 1217-20 (2006) (describing executive branch use of the avoidance canon).
25
See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, 42 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 2196 (December 20, 2006) (“The executive branch shall construe subsection 404(c) of title 30,
. . . which provides for opening of an item of a class of mail otherwise sealed against inspection, in a
manner consistent, to the maximum extent permissible, with the need to conduct searches in exigent
circumstances . . . .”) (emphasis added); Statement on Signing the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 425 (March 9, 2006) (“The executive branch
shall construe the provisions of H.R. 3199 that call for furnishing information to entities outside the
executive branch . . . in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to . . . withhold
information the disclosure of which would impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative
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statements do and do not say. These statements emphatically do not “reserve the right to
disobey” 26 the law. They do not “amount to partial vetoes.” 27 They do not “declare[ the
President’s] intention not to enforce anything he dislikes.” 28 And they do not declare that
the statutes enacted by Congress are unconstitutional.
In fact, they declare exactly the opposite. As President Clinton’s Office of Legal
Counsel has explained, these sorts of signing statements are “analogous to the Supreme
Court’s practice of construing statutes, if possible, to avoid holding them unconstitutional
. . . .” 29 What these signing statements say, in effect, is that if an ambiguity appears on
the face of the statute or becomes apparent in the course of execution, and if one possible
meaning of the statute would render it unconstitutional, then the President will presume
that Congress intended the other, constitutional meaning—and he will faithfully enforce
the statute so understood. 30
Again, this amounts to nothing more than a straightforward application of a canon
of statutory construction that was already well established when Justice Holmes
elaborated it in 1927, 31 a canon that finds its entire rationale in “a just respect for the
legislature” 32 and the faithfulness of Representatives and Senators to their constitutional
oaths. 33 If a statute is ambiguous, we—the President, the Court, the People—presume
that Congress intended it to be constitutional. 34

processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties. . . . The executive
branch shall construe section 756(e)(2) of H.R. 3199 . . . in a manner consistent with the President’s
constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to recommend for the consideration
of the Congress such measures as he judges necessary and expedient.”) (emphasis added); Statement on
Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the
Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1918 (December 30,
2005) (“The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive
branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power .
. . .”) (emphasis added).
26
Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1.
27
Bob Egelko, How Bush Sidesteps the Intent of Congress, S.F. CHRON. May 7, 2006, at A1.
28
Editorial, Veto? Who Needs a Veto?, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2006, at A22.
29
OLC Signing Statements Memorandum, supra note 15, at 133 (emphasis added).
30
See Bradley & Posner, supra note 9, at 28 (“Many of the statements appear simply to be placeholders to
preserve an executive viewpoint about the Constitution, not an indication that the Executive will decline to
fully enforce a statute.”).
31
See Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
32
Ex parte Randolph, 20 F.Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D.Va. 1833) (No. 11,558) (Marshall, C.J.).
33
See U.S. Const. art. VI (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned … shall be bound by Oath
or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.”); 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000) (establishing the oath for all elected
and appointed officials: “I . . . do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to
the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I
will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.”);
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990) (“The Members of the … Legislative
Branch[] are sworn to uphold the Constitution, and they presumably desire to follow its commands.”).
34
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991).
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Now, it may be argued that this canon has grown too strong. After all, it is not
used merely as a tie-breaker for ambiguous statutes. Even if dictionaries or other canons
point in the opposite direction, the canon of constitutional avoidance sometimes wins the
day. As the Supreme Court explained in 1895, “every reasonable construction must be
resorted to in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality,” 35 and reasonable people
may differ on what constitutes a reasonable construction.36 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has held that “[a] statute must be construed, if possible, so as to avoid not only the
conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.” 37 This
aspect of the doctrine is of more recent vintage 38 and has been subject to quite
compelling critique. 39
For present purposes, though, it suffices to note that the President’s application of
this canon has been consistent with the interpretive doctrine espoused by the Court. 40 If
there is any plausible interpretation of a statute that would avoid a serious constitutional
question, the President—like the Court—gives Congress the benefit of the doubt and
adopts the constitutional interpretation.
III. Presidential Signing Statements in Court
An entirely separate issue is whether presidential signing statements are relevant
to judicial interpretation of statutes. Courts sometimes use legislative history to resolve
ambiguities in statutes 41 (though this practice has been subject to withering criticism 42 ).
35

Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (emphasis added).
Compare United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994) (“The statute's use of
‘knowingly’ could be read only to modify ‘uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses’ or it could be read
also to modify ‘in any manner not authorized by [the statute].’), with id. at 81 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If
one were to rack his brains for a way to express the thought that the knowledge requirement in subsection
(a)(1) applied only to the transportation or shipment . . . it would be impossible to construct a sentence
structure that more clearly conveys that thought, and that thought alone.”).
37
United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (emphasis added).
38
See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 391 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); William K. Kelley, Avoiding
Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 840-42 (2001).
39
See Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1495 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)
(“Construing statutes to avoid all constitutional questions treats the penumbra around the Constitution as if
it has independent force, and thereby denies effect to real laws on the basis of insubstantial ‘concerns’.”);
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
800, 816 (1983) (“The practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid raising constitutional questions is . . .
to enlarge the already vast reach of constitutional prohibition beyond even the most extravagant modern
interpretation of the Constitution . . . . And we do not need that.”); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander
Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 89 (discussing problems raised by the modern avoidance doctrine).
40
Cf. Morrison, supra note 24, at 1227 (pointing out that if judicial use of the avoidance canon helps to
ensure that legislation is consistent with the Constitution, executive use of the avoidance canon has the
same virtue).
41
See, e.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (“As for the propriety of
using legislative history at all, common sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional
information rather than ignoring it.”); see also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195 (1983).
42
See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518-28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[W]e should try
36

7

The issue here is whether courts can and should put presidential signing statements to
analogous use.
There are strong arguments on both sides of this question. On the one hand, one
might say that judicial interpretation of statutes should seek to discover legislative intent,
and the President is not a legislator. The President’s power over bills is the power to
“approve” 43 or disapprove legislation; it is a simple, binary, up-or-down decision,
subsequent to, and distinct from, the legislative process. Indeed, the Constitution makes
clear that even though the veto power appears in Article I, it is not legislative power. The
Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States,” 44 not a Congress and a President. And it is “[t]he
Congress,” not the Congress plus the President, who “shall have Power . . . To make all
Laws.” 45
On the other hand, one might say that this is an unduly formalistic view of the
legislative process. In reality, the administration often drafts legislation, and even when it
does not, the entire legislative machinery operates in the shadow of the President’s veto
power. 46 On this view, the President’s understanding of a bill as reflected in a signing
statement is at least as important as the understanding of Congress reflected in legislative
history. Moreover, any effort to glean the intent of Congress from legislative history is
arguably quixotic: first, it is difficult to know how many Representatives and Senators
agreed with any given portion of legislative history; 47 and second, it is arguably
to give the text its fair meaning, whatever various committees might have had to say—thereby affirming
the proposition that we are a Government of laws, not of committee reports.”); ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29-37 (1997); Frank. H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61 (1994); Alex Kozinski, Should Reading
Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807 (1998); Kenneth W. Starr,
Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371 (1987).
43
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
44
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
45
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also id. art IV, § 3 (“The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make
all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.”);
id. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”); id.
amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.”; id. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”); id. amend. XIX (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”); id. amend. XX, § 3 (“Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President
elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified . . . .”); id. amend. XX, § 4 (“The Congress may by law
provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may
choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them . . . .”); id. amend. XXIII, §
2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”); id. amend. XXIV, §
2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”); id. amend. XXV, § 5
(“or of such other body as Congress may by law provide . . .”); id. amend. XXVI, § 2 (“The Congress shall
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). Cf. id. amend. I (“Congress shall make no
law . . .”).
46
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523
(1992).
47
Cf. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Judge Harold Leventhal used
to describe the use of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking
over the heads of the guests for one's friends.”).
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incoherent to attempt to aggregate those individual intentions into a collective intent. 48
By contrast, the President is just a single person, so his interpretive statement poses none
of those problems. For this reason, the argument runs, presidential signing statements are
more valuable because they are inherently reliable as an indication of presidential intent,
whereas legislative history is less valuable because it is inherently unreliable as an
indication of congressional intent.
My own view is the same as Justice Scalia’s. I believe that the project of statutory
interpretation is to discern “the original meaning of the text, not what the original
draftsmen intended.” 49 And I believe that presidential signing statements—like
legislative history—are of very little use in that project. In my view, absent instruction on
this question from Congress, 50 courts should rely on both equally—for the strength of
their reasoning and nothing more.
IV. Legislative Responses
It follows from the analysis above that a general legislative response to the
President’s use of signing statements is probably unnecessary. Nevertheless, because a
bill on this topic, H.R. 264, 51 has been introduced by Representative Jackson Lee and is
now pending before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, I shall
address the balance of my testimony to the constitutionality and the wisdom of such
proposals. I shall begin with the pending bill, and I will conclude by discussing some
other options, including the bill that Senator Specter introduced last summer.
A. Limiting Funds for Signing Statements
Section 3(a) of H.R. 264 provides: “None of the funds made available to the
Executive Office of the President, or to any Executive agency . . . from any source may
be used to produce, publish, or disseminate any statement made by the President
contemporaneously with the signing of any bill or joint resolution presented for signing
by the President.” 52 This provision is probably unconstitutional.
As discussed above, interpreting federal statutes—and ensuring uniform
interpretation throughout the executive branch—is at the very core of the President’s duty
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 53 And presidential signing statements
are an essential tool in the performance of that duty. Congress cannot require Executive

48

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[I]t is virtually impossible to determine the singular ‘motive’ of a collective legislative body . . . .”);
Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 42, at 68 (“Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective
body.”).
49
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 42, at 38.
50
See ifra Part IV-D; see also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2147-51 (2002).
51
H.R. 264, 110th Cong. (2007).
52
H.R. 264, § 3.
53
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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officers to close their ears to presidential signing statements. 54 And a fortiori it cannot
forbid the President from making such statements in the first place.
Admittedly, the bill does not purport to forbid signing statements simpliciter;
rather, it forbids using funds to produce, publish, or disseminate them. And of course
Congress does possess broad power over appropriations. 55 But for Congress to use its
power of the purse to impede a core executive function would raise serious constitutional
concerns. 56 If Congress lacks the power to forbid the President from issuing signing
statements altogether (as it almost certainly does), 57 then it arguably lacks the power to
achieve the same result indirectly with a cunningly crafted spending restriction. 58
54

See infra Part IV-B-1.
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9 (“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.”).
56
See, e.g., Geoffrey Miller, The Appropriations Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 68 WASH.
U. L.Q. 640, 640 (1990) (“Congress has no more authority to control the executive branch by means of the
appropriations power than it would have to control the executive branch under other provisions of the
Constitution.”); H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch
Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527 (1999) (“A condition on the appropriation or expenditure of funds
is invalid if it is properly analyzed as an attempt either to exercise an autonomous executive power or to
compel the President to employ such a power in accordance with congressional policy.”). See also
Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 255 (2005) (book review)
(noting that early congressional practice was to appropriate funds in general terms without restrictions that
would regulate President’s exercise of his executive powers); see also Kate Stith, The Appropriations
Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 644, 646 (1990) (“[T]he legislative veto
violates separation of powers principles, whether the veto is explicit as in [INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983)] or is accomplished indirectly, by conditioning appropriations.”).
57
See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 56, at 254 (“While Congress might be able to refrain from funding the
exercise of presidential powers, Congress cannot go further and statutorily forbid the President’s personal
exercise of his constitutional powers.”) (emphasis added).
58
While the Supreme Court has only alluded to this point, see United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313
(1946); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (“The spending power is of course not unlimited,
but is instead subject to several general restrictions articulated in our cases. . . . [W]e have noted that other
constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.”), the
Executive Branch has taken this position clearly and consistently for more than 70 years, see Constitutional
Issues Raised by Commerce, Justice and State Appropriations Bill, 2001 WL 34907462 (O.L.C.) (“[I]t is
unconstitutional for Congress to place conditions, whether substantive or procedural, on the President’s
exercise of his constitutional authority.”); 20 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 232 (1996) (“While Congress
has broad authority to grant, limit, or withhold appropriations, that power may not be used . . . to
circumvent the steps required by the Constitution for Congress to enact a law or regulation binding on
persons outside the legislative branch.”); 20 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 189 (1996) (“The past practice of
the Executive branch demonstrates its refusal to comply with unconstitutional spending conditions that
trench on core Executive powers.”); 19 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 123 (1995) (“[I]t does not matter in
this instance that Congress has sought to achieve its objectives through the exercise of its spending power,
because the condition it would impose on obligating appropriations is unconstitutional.”); 16 U.S. Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 18, 28 (1992) (“That section 503 was enacted as a condition on the appropriation of money
for the State Department does not save it from constitutional infirmity.”); 14 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel
37, 41 n.3 (1990) (“Nor can section 102(c)(2) be viewed as a legitimate exercise of congressional power
over the appropriation of public funds. Congress may not use that power to attach conditions to executive
branch appropriations requiring the President to relinquish his constitutional discretion in foreign affairs.”);
13 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 258 (1989) (“[T]he fact that Congress appropriates money for the army
does not mean that it can constitutionally condition an appropriation on allowing its armed services
committees to have tactical control of the armed forces. Nor does it follow from Congress’ legislative
establishment of executive branch departments and its appropriation of money to pay the salaries of federal
55
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True, section 3(b) of H.R. 264 would limit the force of the general restriction on
funding presidential signing statements, providing that it “shall apply only to statements
made by the President regarding the bill or joint resolution presented for signing that
contradict, or are inconsistent with, the intent of Congress in enacting the bill or joint
resolution or that otherwise encroach upon the Congressional prerogative to make laws.”
But though this section purports to limit the force of section 3(a), it actually makes the
provision even more constitutionally problematic.
Even if Congress could refuse to fund a core executive function altogether, which
is doubtful in itself, 59 it does not follow that Congress may control the discretion inherent
in a core executive function with a conditional appropriation. 60 So for example, it is not
at all clear that Congress could forbid the President from spending money on a pen and
ink to issue pardons. 61 But even if Congress could do that, it hardly follows that
Congress could provide a pen and ink for pardons while forbidding that they be used to
pardon particular individuals. 62 Inherent in the President’s pardon power is unfettered
discretion to choose whom to pardon. Just as Congress cannot forbid the pardoning of
certain people outright, it cannot achieve the same result with a spending restriction.
Likewise, instructing the executive branch in his interpretation of the law is at the very
heart of the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 63 If
Congress may not forbid the President from communicating his will to the executive

officials that Congress can constitutionally condition creation of a department or the funding of an officer’s
salary on being allowed to appoint the officer.”); 4B U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 731, 733 (1980) (“It is
well established that Congress cannot use its power to appropriate money to circumvent general
constitutional limitations on congressional power.”); 41 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 507, 508 (1960) (“Congress
cannot by direct action compel the President to furnish to it information the disclosure of which he
considers contrary to the national interest. It cannot achieve this result indirectly by placing a condition
upon the expenditure of appropriated funds.”); 37 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 61 (1933) (“Congress may not,
by conditions attached to appropriations, provide for a discharge of the functions of Government in a
manner not authorized by the Constitution.”).
59
Compare J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 1188 (1989)
(“[A] president who acts to discharge his article II duties when Congress has failed or refused to provide
him appropriations for that purpose does not violate the appropriations clause.”), with Prakash, supra note
56, at 254 (“Congress might be able to refrain from funding the exercise of presidential powers . . . .”); see
also Kate Stith, supra note 56, at 644 (characterizing the view that the appropriations power gives Congress
control over all presidential actions as far outside the mainstream).
60
See id. at 645 (“[W]hen the Constitution confers [sic] the President exclusive, enumerated authority,
Congress may not assume that authority as its own by the simple expedient of cutting off or conditioning
appropriations.”).
61
See Sidak, supra note 59, at 1187 (arguing that “the President has the power, implicit in the delegation of
duties and prerogatives to him by the people under article II, to spend funds to perform his constitutional
responsibilities”).
62
See Miller, supra note 56, at 643 (arguing that an appropriations bill barring the use of funds to pardon
anyone for crimes committed in connection with the Iran-Contra affair would be “an unconstitutional
intrusion on the pardon power,” because the Constitution gives the President complete discretion over the
decision of whom to pardon); Stith, supra note 56, at 646-47 (“Congress [may not] use funding legislation
to deny or direct the pardon power or any other exclusive constitutional power of the President.”).
63
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also supra Part I.
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branch—whether through a substantive restriction or a spending restriction 64 —still less
may it forbid him from communicating some thoughts but not others. 65
In any event, even setting these constitutional issues aside, section 3(b) is
essentially self-defeating, because it reduces the scope of section 3 to almost nothing. As
explained above, the vast majority of constitutional signing statements are simple
applications of the canon of constitutional avoidance, which requires the President to
construe statutes, if at all possible, to be consistent with the Constitution. As the Court
has explained, this canon “is followed out of respect for Congress, which we assume
legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.” 66 In other words, the premise of the
canon is never to “contradict, or [be] inconsistent with, the intent of Congress.” 67 To the
contrary, the point of this canon is to choose a constitutional interpretation of ambiguous
statutes—precisely because Congress presumptively intended such interpretations. Thus,
virtually all the President’s signing statements—including almost all of the most
controversial ones 68 —would be exempt from the spending restriction. In short, this
provision would have very few applications at all, and even fewer constitutional ones.
At any rate, even if Congress concludes that it does have power to limit
appropriations in this manner, the separation-of-powers implications are sufficiently
serious that it would probably be wise to avoid a constitutional confrontation on this point
unless absolutely necessary. This President’s use of signing statements hardly justifies
such a constitutionally contentious response.

B. Limiting the Interpretive Force of Signing Statements
Section 4 of H.R. 264 is also problematic. It provides: “For purposes of
construing or applying any Act enacted by the Congress, a governmental entity shall not
take into consideration any statement made by the President contemporaneously with the
President’s signing of the bill or joint resolution that becomes such Act.” 69 The term

64

Cf. J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2104-06 (1989) (arguing that
Congress cannot use its appropriations power to forbid the President from issuing recommendations that
have zero marginal cost to produce).
65
Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“[C]ontent-based restrictions [on speech] are
presumptively invalid”).
66
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-191 (1991); see also Ex parte Randolph, 20 F.Cas. 242, 254
(C.C.D.Va. 1833) (No. 11,558) (Marshall, C.J.).
67
H.R. 264, 110th Cong. § 3(b) (2007).
68
See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, 42 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 2196 (December 20, 2006) (“The executive branch shall construe subsection 404(c) of title 30,
. . . which provides for opening of an item of a class of mail otherwise sealed against inspection, in a
manner consistent, to the maximum extent permissible, with the need to conduct searches in exigent
circumstances . . . .”); Remarks on Signing the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 423 (March 9, 2006); Statement on Signing the Department of
Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1918 (December 30, 2005).
69
H.R. 264, § 4.
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“governmental entity” appears to include executive officers, agencies, and courts. 70 Each
of these applications raises distinct constitutional issues.
1. Limiting Federal Official Use of Signing Statements
It follows from the discussion above 71 that, insofar as it relates to executive
officers and agencies, this provision is almost certainly unconstitutional. The provision
purports to forbid executive officers and agencies from taking into account the
President’s signing statements when interpreting federal law. Such a rule conflicts with
the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 72
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to
implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law,” 73 and
the President “may properly supervise and guide [executive officers’] construction of the
statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the
laws which Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general
executive power in the President alone.” 74 The bill would run afoul of this principle, by
closing the ears of the executive branch to the President’s contemporaneous 75
interpretation of the law. For that reason alone, it would be unconstitutional.
2. Limiting Judicial Use of Presidential Signing Statements
Once again, the bill provides: “For purposes of construing or applying any Act
enacted by the Congress, a governmental entity shall not take into consideration any
statement made by the President contemporaneously with the President’s signing of the
bill or joint resolution that becomes such Act.” 76 As discussed above, this provision is
almost certainly unconstitutional to the extent that it applies to executive agencies and
officers. 77 But federal and state courts are also “governmental entit[ies],” and to the
extent that the provision applies to judicial interpretation, different constitutional issues
arise. Can Congress forbid courts from using presidential signing statements as an aid in
the interpretation of federal statutes?
This is a rich and difficult question, and to answer it, one must begin with the
more general question: Can Congress tell courts what tools and methods to use when
interpreting federal statutes? I considered this question at length in the Harvard Law
Review five years ago, 78 and I concluded that the answer is generally yes: Congress does
have power to tell courts what methods to use when interpreting federal statutes. As I
70

On its face, the phrase “governmental entity” would appear to apply to state officials as well as federal
officials. If so, the provision would raise distinct federalism issues that I do not address today.
71
See supra Part I-A.
72
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
73
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
74
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
75
The constitutional problem could be mitigated, perhaps, by reading the word “contemporaneously” very
narrowly, to mean something like “at the same instant,” but only at the cost of rendering the statute trivial.
76
H.R. 264, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).
77
See supra Part IV-B-1.
78
See Rosenkranz, supra note 50.
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explained, “whatever judicial power exists over interpretive methodology must be
common lawmaking power, which may be trumped by Congress.” 79 As a general matter,
then, Congress has power to promulgate general rules of statutory interpretation, which
would be binding on state and federal courts in the interpretation of federal law.
This is not the end of the analysis, however. Even if Congress generally has
power over the interpretive methodology employed by courts, “[p]articular interpretive
statutes . . . may raise more potent separation-of-powers objections.” 80 In other words,
there is no general objection that mandating interpretive rules invades the judicial power,
but the question remains whether this specific interpretive rule—courts shall not rely on
presidential signing statements in interpreting acts of Congress—would impinge on the
executive power.
I conclude that it probably would not. As explained above, 81 the President’s
executive power inherently includes the power to interpret federal law in the first
instance. 82 Moreover, the President also has power to give interpretive instructions to
executive officers. 83 But it hardly follows that he has inherent and inalienable power to
give such instructions to the courts. To be sure, courts often defer to executive agencies
in their interpretations of federal statutes, 84 and the President himself may be entitled to
at least as much deference, 85 but this is so only as long as Congress wishes to acquiesce
in this rule. 86 If Congress wished to forbid judicial deference to agency interpretations—
or even presidential interpretations—of federal statutes, it could probably do so. A
fortiori, Congress could forbid judicial reliance on one manifestation of presidential
interpretation—the presidential signing statement.
Last summer, Senator Specter introduced just such a bill. That bill provided: “In
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, no State or Federal court shall rely on
or defer to a presidential signing statement as a source of authority.” 87 By restricting its
application to courts rather than executive officials, this provision would avoid the
constitutional problems addressed above. 88
79

Id. at 2103. But cf. Lockhart v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 699, 702-04 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring.).
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See supra Part I.
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See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
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See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2372-80 (2001).
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See Rosenkranz, supra note 50, at 2129 (“Clearly, Congress could pass a statute directing that courts give
no deference to an agency’s interpretation of law.”); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 515-16 (1989) (“The separation-of-powers justification [for
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The only question remaining is whether such a measure is wise. My tentative
answer is that it might be, but only as part of a comprehensive legislative scheme. I have
argued at length that Congress has constitutional power over the tools and methods that
courts use to interpret federal statutes, and that it should exercise this power. 89 But a
crucial aspect of my thesis is that Congress should approach this project
comprehensively. As I explained:
The . . . most obvious advantage of a statutory interpretive
regime is its potential for internal coherence. The Supreme
Court is handicapped across this dimension by the Article
III jurisdictional requirement of a case or controversy.
Because the Court can only develop canons one by one,
common law canons will be devised ad hoc, and will
inevitably fail to form a coherent set. [By contrast,]
[c]ongressionally adopted canons could form a true
“regime”—a set of background interpretive principles with
internal logical coherence. 90
Indeed, the bill introduced by Senator Specter made much the same point, finding that
“Congress can and should exercise [its] power over the interpretation of Federal statutes
in a systematic and comprehensive manner.” 91 This is absolutely right, and I urge the
House to undertake precisely this project. In short, I applaud Congress’s interest in a
federal rule of statutory interpretation addressing presidential signing statements, but I
think such a rule should ideally be adopted as part of a coherent and comprehensive code.
authorized the federal courts to “declare the legality of any presidential signing statement, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought,” on the application of counsel for the United States Senate or House of
Representatives. See S. 3731, § 5. The scope of Congress’s power to grant itself standing to challenge
executive actions remains in doubt. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 149-55 (5th ed. 2003)
(discussing Congress’s ability to create standing); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) (denying
standing to several members of Congress to challenge the Line Item Veto Act, in part because Congress
had not authorized them to sue on behalf of the legislative branch); see also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21,
41-71 (Bork, J., dissenting) (arguing that separation-of-powers principles prevent the courts from
adjudicating disputes raised by Congress in response to presidential action). And if Section 5 is
constitutionally questionable, then section 6 may suffer from a derivative constitutional infirmity. Section
6 would have allowed the Senate or House of Representatives to intervene in any suit implicating a
presidential signing statement. It is an unsettled question whether the Constitution requires intervenors to
have independent Article III standing. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986) (“We need not
decide today whether a party seeking to intervene before a District Court must satisfy not only the
requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III.”); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863
F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that questions of intervenor standing have not been settled and
pointing out problems inherent in granting intervenor standing to parties who do not have Article III
standing); see also David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and
Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 726-28 (1968) (arguing that parties should sometimes be granted
permission to intervene despite not meeting Article III standing requirements because intervenors need not
be given all the rights of a party in the case).
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the recent brouhaha over presidential signing statements is largely
unwarranted. Presidential signing statements are an appropriate means by which the
President fulfills his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” 92 And even the most controversial ones are, in truth, nothing more than the
application of the well-settled canon of constitutional avoidance—a canon which, as
Chief Justice John Marshall explained, was born of “a just respect for the legislature.” 93
I do not believe that any legislative response to the President’s use of signing
statements is necessarily called for. And I believe that the bill pending before the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform has deep constitutional flaws. If some
legislative response is thought necessary, I would recommend something akin to sections
1 through 4 of the bill introduced last summer by Senator Specter, 94 which would forbid
state and federal courts, but not executive officials, from relying on presidential signing
statements as a source of authority in the interpretation of federal statutes.95 Better still, I
would urge Congress to follow Senator Specter’s exhortation to “exercise th[e] power
over the interpretation of Federal statutes in a systematic and comprehensive manner,” 96
by incorporating any such provision into coherent and codified federal rules of statutory
interpretation.
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